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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of commodity terms of trade (CToT) volatility on
economic growth (and its sources) in a sample of 69 commodity-dependent countries,
and assesses the role of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) and quality of institutions in
their long-term growth performance. Using annual data over the period 19812014, we
employ the Cross-Sectionally augmented Autoregressive Distributive Lag (CS-ARDL)
methodology for estimation to account for cross-country heterogeneity, cross-sectional
dependence, and feedback e¤ects. We nd that while CToT volatility exerts a negative
impact on economic growth (operating through lower accumulation of physical capital
and lower TFP), the average impact is dampened if a country has a SWF and better
institutional quality (hence a more stable government expenditure).
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1 Introduction
Commodity-dependent countries are a heterogenous mix of high-, middle-, and low-income
countries that possess a large share of the worlds natural resources (90 percent of crude oil
reserves for example), and represent close to 20 percent of world GDP and global exports.
Natural resource wealth has enabled some of these countries to accumulate substantial assets
(placed in Sovereign Wealth Funds in a growing number of countries), and provided a bu¤er
against commodity-price shocks in several cases. However, not all resource-rich countries
have been able to leverage their assets to raise long-term economic growth due to a number of
factors, including pro-cyclical scal policies (especially in the Middle East), underdeveloped
public nancial management frameworks, and fragile political systems. For instance, Frankel
et al. (2013) show that quality of institutions can play an important role in making scal
policy less pro-cyclical, hence turning commodity wealth into a blessing rather than a curse.
Moreover, when governments rely heavily on revenues derived from commodities, they are
subject to commodity price volatility, which if not managed properly, can result in higher
GDP growth volatility and disappointing long-term economic performance.1
This paper studies the impact of commodity price volatility on long-term economic growth
in a sample of 69 commodity-dependent countries over the period 19812014, and assesses
the role of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) and quality of institutions in shaping the growth
performance of these countries in the face of the extreme volatility in resource revenues
that they have experienced over time. The constructed Commodity Terms of Trade (CToT)
volatility measure is based on a monthly country-specic commodity-price index that de-
pends on the composition of a particular countrys commodity export- and import-baskets,
and is therefore weakly exogenous.2 Moreover, International Monetary Fund (2015) argues
that strong institutions and appropriate stabilization bu¤ers can increase the chances of a
successful public investment scale-up, while Bahal et al. (2015) show that higher govern-
ment spending on infrastructure facilities (like roads, highways, and power) and/or health
and education may have a complementary impact on private sector investment by raising
the marginal productivity of private capital. We therefore also study the possible growth
channels i.e. total factor productivity (TFP) and physical capital accumulation through
which CToT volatility (and SWFs) a¤ect long-term economic growth.
We employ the Cross-Sectionally augmented Autoregressive Distributive Lag (CS-ARDL)
1For instance, over the 1981-2014 period GDP growth volatility in the Gulf Cooperation Council region
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) has been at least three times
higher than that of Chile and Norway.
2The CToT index is based on the weighted average of prices of 45 primary commodities, and given that
commodity prices are largely determined in global markets and each country (through production and exports
of commodities) has only a limited impact on them, our constructed CToT index is weakly exogenous.
1
approach for estimation to account for joint endogeneity of explanatory variables, cross-
country heterogeneity, and cross-sectional dependence. Accounting for these factors is par-
ticularly important in our panel data analysis as the e¤ect of commodity price volatility
on growth varies across cross-section units and depends critically on country-specic factors
(such as quality of institutions, level of economic and nancial development, strength of pub-
lic nancial management frameworks, and type of stabilization bu¤ers) as well as feedback
e¤ects from determinants of GDP growth. Moreover, controlling for observed characteris-
tics specic to countries alone need not ensure error cross-section independence. Neglecting
such dependencies can lead to biased estimates and spurious inference, particularly given
the rapid increase in globalization and exposures to global shocks.
Our results indicate that, on average, a highly-volatile CToT harms economic growth
of natural resource dependent countries in the long term. This is primarily due to price
volatility, which has been intrinsic in commodity markets. Nonetheless, there are signicant
heterogeneities across countries some economies have been able to grow strongly and sus-
tainably through multiple commodity price cycles (e.g. Chile and Norway), while many have
not. Trying to explain these variations in performance, our econometric results show that
having a SWF, on average, can mitigate such negative growth e¤ects, especially in countries
that enjoy higher-quality institutions (and hence less pro-cyclical scal policies). While we do
not explicitly model the impact of scal pro-cyclicality, International Monetary Fund (2015)
argues that countries with weak political institutions are more prone to wasteful spending
and pro-cyclical policies. Examining the channels through which these e¤ects operate, we
nd that CToT volatility is associated with lower accumulation of physical capital, lower
TFP, and thereby weaker growth. We show that long-term stabilization savings and sound
institutional frameworks are essential for dampening the negative e¤ects of CToT volatility
via less frequent "stop-go" cycles in public investment and by enhancing productivity.
We are certainly not the rst ones to emphasize the importance of volatility for economic
growth. Ramey and Ramey (1995) discuss the consequences of excess volatility for long-
run growth. Blattman et al. (2007) investigate the impact of terms of trade volatility
on the growth performance of 35 commodity-dependent countries between 1870 and 1939.
Aghion et al. (2009), using data on 83 countries over 19602000, show that higher levels
of exchange rate volatility can stunt growth, especially in countries with relatively under-
developed capital markets. Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) estimate a model for 14 sub-
Saharan African countries over 19801995 and show that growth is negatively a¤ected by
terms of trade volatility, and investment by real exchange rate instability. van der Ploeg and
Poelhekke (2009, 2010) nd that the volatility of unanticipated GDP growth has a negative
impact on economic growth, conditional on the countrys level of nancial development.
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Most closely related to our paper is Cavalcanti et al. (2015), who investigate the e¤ects
of CToT volatility (CToT ) on long-run economic growth of both commodity exporters and
importers. However, we rely on a higher frequency (and exogenously determined) measure
of CToT , use a di¤erent estimation technique, and most importantly, have a di¤erent focus:
namely the role of SWFs and quality of institutions in mitigating the negative growth e¤ects
of CToT . While we do not explicitly control for other determinants of real GDP growth, the
country-specic intercepts, di¤erent short-run slope coe¢ cients and error variances, as well
as cross-sectional averages of all the variables (as proxies for unobserved common factors) in
the CS-ARDL regressions capture the e¤ects of such unobserved variables/factors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the econometric model
and methodology; Section 3 presents the main results; and Section 4 concludes.
2 The Econometric Model and Methodology
We begin with the following panel data model that can nest much of the existing work on
the empirics of economic growth, from the "Barro cross-sectional regression" to the static
and dynamic panel data techniques:
yit = (  1) yit 1 + 0xit + cyi + t + "it; (1)
for i = 1; 2; :::; N and t = 1; 2; :::; T
where yit is the growth rate of real GDP per capita in country i; and yit 1 is the logarithm
of lagged real GDP per capita. xit is a vector of explanatory variables; t is the time-specic
e¤ect; cyi is the country-specic e¤ect; and "it is the error term. Within this framework, the
steady state output growth is exogenously determined by technological progress, while the
speed of adjustment toward the equilibrium is a function of the determinants of steady state
level of output and some initial conditions. Equation (1) allows one to study the potential
determinants of steady state level of output and test the conditional convergence hypothesis
in which countries converge to parallel equilibrium growth paths.
Much of the empirical growth literature is based on estimations of equation (1) using
a cross-sectional approach or xed/random e¤ects panel estimators. Cross-sectional regres-
sions clearly su¤er from endogeneity problems as by construction, the initial level of income,
yit 1, is correlated with the error term, "it. This endogeneity bias is larger when considering
the simultaneous determination of virtually all growth determinants, and the correlation of
unobserved country-specic factors (arising from global shocks) and the explanatory vari-
ables. Traditional static panel data estimators such as xed and random e¤ects are not
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consistent either, due to the inclusion of lagged dependent variables in regressions (e.g.
the initial level of GDP per capita). Specically, the xed e¤ects estimator is inconsistent
because it usually eliminates cyi by a de-meaning transformation that induces a negative
correlation between the transformed error and the lagged dependent variables of order 1=T ,
which in short panels remains substantial. The assumption of a lack of correlation between
cyi and the explanatory variables required for random e¤ects consistency is also violated as
both yit and yit 1 are functions of cyi. These estimators (or their standard errors) will be
biased if the errors show either heteroscedasticity or serial correlation.
We specify our growth regression dynamically and include lagged GDP per capita on the
right hand side. Hence, the elimination of xed e¤ects from equation (1) in any standard
OLS-based estimation procedure implies the violation of the orthogonality condition between
the error term and explanatory variables. For this reason, we estimate this equation using
the CS-ARDL approach. While a system GMM estimator can e¤ectively deal with the
endogeneity problem and country-specic xed e¤ects, it restricts all the slope coe¢ cients
to be identical across countries; assumes that the time e¤ects are homogenous; and that the
errors are cross-sectionally independent. If any of these conditions are not satised, the GMM
method can produce inconsistent estimates of the average values of parameters; see Pesaran
and Smith (1995) for more details. The time-specic heterogeneity is an underestimated but
at the same time very important concern in dynamic panel data models. Country-specic
time-e¤ects can capture a number of unobservable characteristics in macroeconomic and
nancial applications such as (a) institutional arrangements, (b) the patterns of trade, and
(c) political developments. The time-specic heterogeneity is induced by oil price shocks,
the stance of global nancial cycles, and/or other global common factors, which a¤ect all
countries but to di¤erent degrees. The CS-ARDL methodology explained below accounts
for heterogenous time e¤ects and deals with cross-sectional dependencies e¤ectively.
2.1 CS-ARDL Methodology
When panels of data are available, there exist a number of alternative estimation methods
that vary on the extent to which they account for parameter heterogeneity. At one extreme
is the Mean Group (MG) approach in which separate equations are estimated for each
country and the average of estimated coe¢ cients across countries is examined. Pesaran and
Smith (1995) show that the MG method produces consistent estimates of the average of the
parameters when the time-series dimension of the data is su¢ ciently large. At the other
extreme are the traditional estimators in which dynamics are simply pooled and treated
as homogeneous. Prominent examples include xed e¤ects (FE), random e¤ects (RE), and
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generalized methods of moments (GMM). In between the two extremes is the pooled mean
group (PMG) estimator of Pesaran and Shin (1999) which is an intermediate case between the
averaging and pooling methods of estimation, and involves aspects of both. It restricts the
long-run coe¢ cients to be homogenous over the cross-sections, but allows for heterogeneity
in intercepts, short-run coe¢ cients (including the speed of adjustment) and error variances.
The PMG estimator also generates consistent estimates of the mean of short-run coe¢ cients
across countries by taking the simple average of individual country coe¢ cients.
We use the Cross-Sectionally augmented Autoregressive Distributive Lag (CS-ARDL)
methodology of Chudik and Pesaran (2015) and Chudik et al. (2016) to estimate, and
report the pooled long-run estimates based on the PMG estimator because it o¤ers the
best available choice in terms of consistency and e¢ ciency in our sample.3 The CS-ARDL
method avoids the need for pre-testing the order of integration given that they are valid
whether the variables of interest are I(0) or I(1). It is also robust to omitted variables bias
and simultaneous determination of growth regressors. The main requirements for the validity
of this methodology are that, rst, there exists a long-run relationship among the variables of
interest and, second, the dynamic specication of the model is su¢ ciently augmented so that
the regressors become weakly exogenous and the resulting residual is serially uncorrelated.
To explain the CS-ARDL estimator in detail, consider the following panel ARDL model
of order 1 with a multifactor error structure:
yit = cyi + iyi;t 1 + 
0
0ixit + 
0
1ixi;t 1 + uit, (2)
uit = 
0
ift + "it, (3)
!it =
 
xit
git
!
= c!i +iyi;t 1 +  0ift + vit, (4)
where as before i = 1; 2; :::; N; t = 1; 2; :::; T , and xit is kx  1 vector of regressors specic to
cross-section unit i at time t; cyi and c!i are individual xed e¤ects for unit i, git is kg  1
vector of covariates specic to unit i (not observed in the panel data model), kx + kg = k,
"it are the idiosyncratic errors,  i is an m  k matrix of factor loadings (k  m), i
is a k  1 vector of unknown coe¢ cients, and vit is assumed to follow a general linear
covariance stationary process distributed independently of "it, the idiosyncratic errors. ft is
anm1 vector of unobserved common factors, which can be stationary or nonstationary; see
Kapetanios et al. (2011). The source of error term dependencies across countries is captured
by ft, whereas the impacts of these factors on each country are governed by the idiosyncratic
loadings in  i. The individual-specic errors, "it, are distributed independently across i and
3See also Chudik et al. (2013) and Chudik et al. (2017) for other applications of the CS-ARDL method.
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t; they are not correlated with the unobserved common factors or the regressors; and they
have zero mean, variance greater than zero, and nite fourth moments. The unobserved
common factors, or the heterogenous time e¤ects, may be captured/proxied by adding cross-
sectional averages of the observables to our regressions, see Pesaran (2006) and Chudik and
Pesaran (2015).4
Assuming that N is su¢ ciently large, Chudik and Pesaran (2015) show that the un-
observed common factors, ft, can be proxied by de-trended cross-section averages of zit =
(yit;x
0
it;g
0
it)
0 and their lags:
ft = G (L)ezwt +Op(N 1=2), (5)
where G (L) is a distributed lag function, ezwt = zwt   czw is a k + 1 dimensional vector of
de-trended cross-section averages, zwt = (ywt;x0wt;g
0
wt)
0 =
PN
i=1wizit is a k + 1 dimensional
vector of cross-section averages, and czw =
PN
i=1wi (Ik+1  Ai) 1 czi with Ai = A 10i A1i,
A0i =
0BBBB@
1  00i 0
1kg
0
kx1
Ikx 0
kxkg
0
kg1
0
kgkx
Ikg
1CCCCA ; and A1i =
0BBBB@
i 
0
1i 0
1kg
xi 0
kxkx
0
kxkg
gi 0
kgkx
0
kgkg
1CCCCA :
The weights satisfy the following normalization condition:
PN
i=1wi = 1:
Substituting (5) into (2), we obtain
yit = c

yi + iyi;t 1 + 
0
0ixit + 
0
1ixi;t 1 + 
0
i (L) zwt + "it +Op(N
 1=2); (6)
where
i (L) =
1X
`=0
i`L
` = G0 (L)i, (7)
and cyi = cyi   0i (1) czw.
Equation (2) can be estimated using the MG and PMG estimators, however, for the
estimators to be valid, a su¢ cient number of lags of cross-section averages must be included
in individual equations of the panel (as we truncate the innite polynomial distributed lag
function i (L)), and the number of cross-section averages must be at least as large as the
number of unobserved common factors. Moreover, as always T must be large enough so that
4Conditioning on observed variables (growth regressors) specic to countries alone need not ensure error
cross-section independence that underlies much of the panel data literature. Neglecting such dependencies
can lead to biased estimates and spurious inference, particularly given the rapid increase in world trade,
international nancial linkages, and exposures to common shocks.
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the model can be estimated for each cross-section unit.
The estimated MG vector is dened as  =E(i);where the individual long-run or level
coe¢ cients are
i =
0i + 1i
1  i
: (8)
To obtain the PMG estimates, the individual long-run coe¢ cients are restricted to be the
same across countries, namely:
i = ; i = 1; 2; :::; N: (9)
The PMG estimator uses a maximum likelihood approach to estimate the model based
on the NewtonRaphson algorithm.
3 Empirical Results
To empirically test the relationship between economic growth and commodity terms of trade
(CToT) growth, gCToT , and volatility, CToT , we use annual data from 1980 to 2014 on: real
GDP per capita, a CToT index based on the prices of 45 primary commodities, a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if a country has a SWF, and a measure of institutional
quality. To investigate the possible mechanisms through which CToT volatility can harm
economic growth, we focus on: (i) TFP growth; and (ii) physical capital accumulation. We
obtain the data on real GDP, capital stock, and TFP from the Penn World Table Version 9.0
database and the institutional quality data from the Political Risk Services Group databases.
As in Spatafora and Tytell (2009), we dene a country-specic measure of the CToT
index as:
CToTi =
Y
j

Pj
MUV
Xij
=
Y
j

Pj
MUV
Mij
; (10)
where MUV is a manufacturing unit value index used as deator, Xij (Mij) is the share
of exports (imports) of commodity j in country is GDP, and Pj is the individual com-
modity price in month  . We construct this monthly index based on data (on the prices
of 45 primary commodities) obtained from the International Monetary Fund International
Financial Statistics databases. Note that by construction, the movements in the CToT in-
dex are due to changes in commodity prices as the export and import shares are taken to
be constant over time (i.e. long-term averages).5 The CToT index (10) allows countries to
be inuenced by changes in commodity prices di¤erently, depending on the composition of
5These long-term averages relate to di¤erent time periods across countries based on data availability.
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their export and import baskets. This is in contrast to the "standard" commodity price
indices most commonly used in the literature, such as the "All Primary Commodities Index"
in International Monetary Fund (2012), which attaches the same weight to each country in
the regression analysis. Equation (10) is then used to construct two important variables.
The rst is an annual CToT growth series, gCToT;it, which is calculated in two steps: (i)
year-on-year growth rate of the monthly CToT index is taken, and (ii) the average over the
year is calculated. The second is a measure of realized CToT volatility for year t, CToT;it,
which is constructed as the standard deviation of the year-on-year growth rates of CToTi
during months  = 1; :::; 12 in year t. Therefore, in contrast to most studies in the growth
literature which employ time-invariant measures of volatility, we construct a time-varying
measure of commodity price volatility, CToT;it.
Table 1: List of the 69 Primary Commodity Exporters Included in the Sample
Algeria12 Egypt Madagascar2 Qatar1
Angola12 Ethiopia2 Malawi2 Russia1
Argentina Gabon1 Mali2 Saudi Arabia1
Armenia Gambia2 Moldova Senegal1
Australia1 Ghana12 Mongolia1 Sierra Leone
Azerbaijan12 Guatemala Mozambique Sudan
Bahrain1 Guinea2 Myanmar2 Syria2
Bolivia1 Guinea-Bissau2 Namibia Togo
Botswana1 Honduras New Zealand1 Trinidad and Tobago1
Brunei Darussalam12 Iceland Nicaragua Tanzania
Burkina Faso Indonesia1 Niger Uganda2
Cameroon Iran1 Nigeria1 United Arab Emirates12
Chile1 Iraq Norway1 Uruguay
Colombia Jamaica Oman12 Venezuela1
Congo2 Kazakhstan1 Panama1 Yemen2
Côte dIvoire Kenya Paraguay Zambia2
Cyprus Kuwait1 Peru1 Zimbabwe
Ecuador
Notes: Countries are classied as commodity exporters if primary commodities constitute more than 50 percent of their exports.
1 indicates that the country has a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). The 20 countries which could not be included in the TFP
and Physical Capital accumulation regressions due to unavailability of data are denoted by 2.
The CS-ARDL method requires a su¢ cient number of time periods for consistent estima-
tion of country-specic coe¢ cients. To ensure this, we include only countries in our sample
for which we have at least 25 consecutive annual observations on real GDP and CToT. Fur-
thermore, we only focus on countries that are commodity dependant those for which the
ratio of primary commodities to total exports exceeds 50%. Subject to these requirements,
we end up with 69 countries in our sample listed in Table 1. To identify which of these
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countries have established SWFs, we use information from the Sovereign Wealth Fund In-
stitute and end up with 29 countries with SWFs in our sample denoted by 1 in Table 1.
Listing the origin of accumulated funds by country in Table 2, we observe that the majority
of these SWFs (19 out of 29) were set-up using revenues from exports of crude oil and gas.
A large portion (10 out of 29) was established in countries that are major oil exporters and
are members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), denoted
by  in Table 2. We also provide the inception year of the funds in the same table. However,
note that it usually takes years (if not a decade) to set-up a SWF, as prior to inception,
parliament needs to debate the architecture of the fund; for instance, the amount transferred
to the SWF in each scal year and whether there are any provisions for withdrawing from
the fund to nance public expenditure as opposed to just using interest income from the
endowment for the budget. Nevertheless, the fact that a country has established a SWF
provides a valuable signal, as it indicates that the government and the legislature would like
to manage the resource wealth e¢ ciently and are concerned with (and willing to deal with)
macroeconomic stabilization as well as intergenerational equity.
Table 2: Sovereign Wealth Funds by Origin and Inception
Country Origin Inception Country Origin Inception
Algeria Oil and Gas 2000 Mongolia Minerals 2011
Angola Oil 2012 New Zealand Non-Commodity 2003
Australia Non-Commodity 2006 Nigeria Oil 2012
Azerbaijan Oil 1999 Norway Oil 1990
Bahrain Oil 2006 Oman Oil and Gas 1980
Bolivia Non-Commodity 2012 Panama Non-Commodity 2012
Botswana Minerals 1994 Peru Non-Commodity 1999
Brunei Darussalam Oil 1983 Qatar Oil and Gas 2005
Chile Copper 2006 Russia Oil 2008
Gabon Oil 1998 Saudi Arabia Oil 1952
Ghana Oil 2011 Senegal Non-Commodity 2012
Indonesia Non-Commodity 2006 Trinidad and Tobago Oil and Gas 2000
Iran Oil and Gas 1999 United Arab Emirates Oil 1976
Kazakhstan Oil 2000 Venezuela Oil 1998
Kuwait Oil 1953
Notes: Some countries have more than one fund, here we have taken the inception year to be that of the rst fund, which
tends to be the main one.  indicates that the country is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute.
Figure 1 plots a simple bivariate relationship between real GDP per capita growth and
its volatility (measured by its standard deviation over the full sample, 1981-2014), and shows
that there exists a negative relationship between the two variables. The observation that
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higher volatility in output dampens growth was in fact discussed extensively in the seminal
paper of Ramey and Ramey (1995). Moreover, we note that in our sample of 69 commodity-
dependant countries, there appears to be a positive association between CToT volatility and
GDP growth volatility which in turn has a negative e¤ect on output growth.
Figure 1: Scatter Plots of GDP Growth and Volatility of CToT against Volatility
of GDP Growth, 1981-2014
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Source: Authorscalculation based on data from Penn World Table Version 9.0 and International Monetary
Fund International Financial Statistics databases. These are cross-sectional averages over 1981-2014.
Figure 2 depicts a simple bivariate relationship between CToT volatility and the growth
of real GDP per capita (as well as the growth rate of TFP and physical capital accumulation)
in our sample of 69 countries over the period 1981-2014. They suggest that CToT volatility
exerts a negative impact on economic growth operating mainly through lower productivity
growth and lower physical capital accumulation. The rest of the paper use the CS-ARDL
approach for estimation in order to investigate whether the above indicative results continue
to hold up once we deal with, for instance, possible endogeneity problems, dynamics, cross-
country heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence. We will also investigate the potential
role of SWFs and institutions in dampening the negative e¤ects of CToT volatility on growth.
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Figure 2: Scatter Plots of CToT Volatility against Real GDP growth, TFP
Growth and Capital Accumulation, 1981-2014
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3.1 The Long-Run E¤ects of Volatility
To examine the long-run e¤ects of CToT volatility on output growth, we estimate the fol-
lowing panel CS-ARDL model:
yit = c

yi +
pX
l=1
ilyi;t l +
pX
l=0

0
ilxi:t l +
qX
l=0
ailyt l +
qX
l=0
b
0
ilxt l + "it; (11)
where yit is the growth rate of real GDP per capita for country i and year t, xit is a 2 1
vector of explanatory variables, namely the growth rate of the CToT index, gCToT;it, and
its volatility, CToT;it. The terms yt and xt denote the simple cross-section averages of
yit and xit in year t. Moreover, to determine the channel(s) through which GDP growth
is negatively a¤ected by CToT volatility in our sample, we follow Beck et al. (2000) in
investigating two possible sources which are acknowledged in the literature, namely, TFP
and physical capital investment. We therefore also estimate the following regressions:
wit = c

wi +
pX
l=1
ilwi;t l +
pX
l=0

0
ilxi:t l +
qX
l=0
ailwt l +
qX
l=0
b
0
ilxt l + "it; (12)
where wit = lnWit   lnWit 1 is the growth rate of Wit = fTFP or physical capital per
capita for country i and time tg; while wt is the simple cross-sectional average of wit,
with all other variables as dened in equation (11). However, data on TFP and physical
capital for some of the countries in our dataset were not available, and so these regressions
are based on a sample of 49 countries (those which are not denoted by 2 in Table 1).
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While the order of the ARDL process must be chosen long enough to ensure that residuals
of the error-correction model are serially uncorrelated, with a limited number of time-series
observations, it should not be overextended as this imposes excessive parameter requirements
on the data. Given the time-series requirements of the panel (with Tmin = 25 and Tmax = 34),
we cap the lag order at three, in other words we set p  3. In any case, given that we are
working with growth rates which are only moderately persistent, a maximum lag order of
3 should be su¢ cient to fully account for the short-run dynamics. While, for completeness,
we report the results for p = 1; 2; and 3, we mainly rely on those with p = 3.
Panel (a) in Table 3 reports the results of our baseline regressions in which the focus is
on the growth impact of CToT volatility (as well as the channels of impact, discussed next).
While the PMG estimate of the commodity terms of trade volatility is negative for all lag
orders in the "Real GDP per capita" bloc, it is statistically signicant at the 5% level only for
p = 3. Therefore, once we allow for long enough lags, to fully account for short-run dynamics,
the results suggest that economic growth is adversely linked to commodity price volatility
in the long-term.6 Moreover, gCToT , is signicantly positively related to economic growth,
but its impact on real GDP per capita is smaller than that of CToT volatility. Overall,
while commodity price booms signicantly increase economic growth, volatility a¤ects it
negatively. This nding can be partly explained by the fact that scal and current account
balances of commodity-exporting countries are a¤ected by swings in resources revenues with
destabilizing e¤ects on the macroeconomy. Note that the positive growth e¤ect of gCToT
provides evidence against the traditional resource curse hypothesis, which argues that it is
the level of resource abundance that a¤ects economic growth negatively, and is in line with
results obtained recently in the literature; see, for instance, Alexeev and Conrad (2009),
Cavalcanti et al. (2011b, 2011a, 2015), El-Anshasy et al. (2015), and Esfahani et al. (2013).
We next turn to the long-run e¤ects of CToT volatility on the two growth channels. The
results, reported in the second and third blocs of panel (a) in Table 3, indicate that both
commodity terms of trade growth and volatility have signicant e¤ects on TFP and physi-
cal capital accumulation for commodity abundant countries, with the coe¢ cient of CToT;it
being negative and signicant across all lag orders. The negative association between CToT
volatility and TFP growth lends itself to the argument that natural resource abundant coun-
tries have fewer possibilities for technological progress. Moreover, while a commodity price
boom increases the physical capital stock, higher volatility of commodity prices signicantly
reduces it. Therefore, capital accumulation seems to be another important channel through
which volatility a¤ects GDP per capita growth; which is in line with what is argued in
6See Mohaddes and Pesaran (2014) and Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016) for the negative e¤ects of oil
revenue volatility on the Iranian economy.
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Gylfason and Zoega (2006) and Esfahani et al. (2014) among others.
A possible explanation for this nding is that economic agents tend to save less in com-
modity abundant countries because they perceive the revenues from primary commodity
exports to be a permanent stream of future income. Another possibility is that the uncer-
tainty arising from commodity price volatility might suppress the accumulation of physical
capital by risk averse investors. Moreover, as noted by Catão et al. (2009), terms of trade
volatility adversely a¤ects capital accumulation and growth by raising the countrys default
risk, hence widening the country spreads, and lowering its borrowing capacity.
Table 3: Estimates of the Long-Run E¤ects on Real GDP, TFP and Physical
Capital Growth (1981-2014)
Dependant variable
is the growth rate of: Real GDP per capita Total Factor Productivity Physical Capital
Lags 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
(a) Baseline Regressions
CToT Growth 0.0015y 0.0028z 0.0041z 0.0023y 0.0033z 0.0041z -0.0009 0.0010 0.0022y
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010)
CToT Volatility -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0047y -0.0054y -0.0085z -0.0124z -0.0044y -0.0045* -0.0079z
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0028)
CD Test Statistic -2.30 -1.57 -0.34 -0.46 0.17 0.37 -2.01 -1.34 -0.20
No Countries 69 69 69 49 49 49 49 49 49
No Observations 2,218 2,149 2,080 1,577 1,528 1,479 1,577 1,528 1,479
(b) Regressions with the Interactive Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) Dummy
CToT Growth 0.0015* 0.0027z 0.0038z 0.0022y 0.0033z 0.0041z -0.0009 0.0011 0.0023y
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010)
CToT Volatility -0.0039* -0.0043* -0.0067y -0.0061* -0.0078y -0.0113z -0.0057y -0.0075y -0.0117z
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0036)
Interactive SWF Dummy 0.0041 0.0064* 0.0073* 0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0047 0.0060 0.0112y 0.0110y
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0051)
CD Test Statistic -2.38 -1.68 -0.37 -0.46 0.14 0.33 -2.06 -1.38 -0.22
No Countries 69 69 69 49 49 49 49 49 49
No Observations 2,218 2,149 2,080 1,577 1,528 1,479 1,577 1,528 1,479
Notes: The CS-ARDL specications are given by equations 11 and 12. Symbols z, y, and * denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively. CD is the cross-section dependence (CD) test of Pesaran (2004, 2015).
To determine the overall e¤ect of changes in CToT growth and its volatility, we calculate
the average percentage e¤ect of the two CToT variables on output per capita and TFP
growth rates as well as on the change in capital accumulation. We use the estimates based
on p = 3 in panel (a) of Table 3 together with the average realized CToT growth (0.3
percent per year) and volatility (2.3 percent per year) across the 69 countries, and obtain an
overall negative e¤ect of between 0.01 and 0.03 percentage points per year (corresponding
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to -0.5 to -1.2 percent loss in per capita output or lower TFP and investment over the
sample period) suggesting that the negative growth e¤ects of CToT volatility o¤set the
positive impact of commodity booms in the long run. We now need to ensure that we have
successfully dealt with error cross-sectional dependence in our regressions. To this end, we
report the cross-section dependence (CD) test of Pesaran (2004, 2015), which is based on the
average of pair-wise correlations of the residuals from the underlying CS-ARDL regressions.
Under the null of weak error cross-sectional dependence, the CD statistics are asymptotically
distributed as N(0; 1), and therefore we cannot reject at the 10% level the null of no error
cross sectional dependence for p = 2 and 3:
Finally, as we expect the long-run growth e¤ects of CToT volatility for primary commod-
ity exporters to be di¤erent from those countries that are not dependant on a handful of
primary products, we run the same regressions as in (11) but for a sample of 61 countries that
have a more diversied export basket. The results for these 61 countries show that CToT
volatility is not signicantly related to economic growth in the long-run. This is mainly be-
cause these countries have a more diversied basket of exports, especially manufacturing or
service-sector goods, and so they are expected to grow faster and be better insured against
price uctuations in individual commodities. This is in contrast to the experience of the
sample of 69 primary product exporters in Table 3, for which our results indicate that higher
CToT volatility harms growth. The results for the sample of 61 diversied countries are not
reported here, but are available upon request.7
3.2 The Role of SWFs and Institutional Quality
While many SWFs have existed for over half a century (such as the Kuwait Investment
Authority which was founded in 1953), a large number of funds have been established (by
major commodity exporters in particular) over the last two decades. These SWFs accumu-
lated large assets during the most recent oil-price boom (20022008), have played a major
role in reserve management of commodity revenues, and contributed to macroeconomic sta-
bilization in several cases. SWFs have been established for a variety of reasons, ranging from
scal stabilization (that is to help smooth the impact on government spending of revenues
that are large and volatile), to long-term saving for future needs of the economy, or of specic
groups such as pensioners, or for future generations.8 One of the main short-term objectives
of SWFs is to counter the adverse macroeconomic e¤ects of commodity price volatility. We
next investigate whether SWFs have been successful, on average, in fullling this objective.
7The asymmetric e¤ects of CToT volatility on GDP growth in the two country groups considered (com-
modity dependant and more diversied countries) is also supported by the results in Cavalcanti et al. (2015).
8For a discussion of the objectives of SWFs and their activities see, for instance, Das et al. (2010).
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Using data from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, we identify 29 countries in our
sample as having established SWFs. These are denoted by 1 in Table 1. 19 of these are
funded by revenue from exports of crude oil and gas, of which ten are members of the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and seven are located in the
Persian Gulf. It is estimated by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute that in late 2016 the
total assets of SWFs were around $7.5 trillion with over 60% of these being funded by oil
and gas exports. The prominent examples are Norways Government Pension Fund ($830),
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority ($773), Saudi Arabias Fund (SAMA) ($685), Kuwait
Investment Authority ($592), and Qatar Investment Authority ($256), with the number in
brackets referring to their market values in billions in June 2015.9
To examine the role of SWFs in mitigating the negative growth e¤ects of CToT volatility
and the channels of impact, we add an interactive SWF dummy, (SWF  CToT;it) where
SWF takes the value of unity if a country has established a SWF anytime over the period
1981-2014 and zero otherwise, to the vector of explanatory variables, xit, in equations (11)
and (12). The results are reported in panel (b) of Table 3. As before, the long-run e¤ects
of CToT;it is negative for real GDP per capita growth and the channels of impact are lower
TFP and physical capital accumulation. Note also that the coe¢ cient of CToT volatility
is negative and statistically signicant for all lag orders. More importantly, the estimated
coe¢ cient of the interactive SWF dummy is positive and statistically signicant in the rst
and third blocs. In other words, countries that have a SWF in our sample have, on average,
performed better when it comes to mitigating the negative growth e¤ects of CToT volatility
and managed to sustain a higher level of capital accumulation in the face of the extreme
volatility in resource revenues. Our results, therefore, suggests that one is better able to
dampen the negative long-run growth e¤ects of CToT volatility with a well-functioning SWF
that can e¤ectively deal with the adverse e¤ects of (excess) commodity price volatility add
to the fund when commodity prices are high and transfer less to it or even withdraw from it
when prices are low to smooth expenditure.
For instance, oil exporters in the Persian Gulf, enjoyed a large increase in their SWFs
assets while oil prices were high for most of the past decade, but more recently many of
them have dipped into their SWFs following the collapse in oil prices since 2014.10 Rather
than cutting back on public expenditure (social welfare programs, public salaries, and in-
frastructure spending), many governments either withdrew money from their funds (such as
9Note that given the objective of these funds, on average 65% of the SWF assets are held in public and
private equities (61% Norway; 72% SAMA; 65% Kuwait; 68% Qatar; 62% Abu Dhabigures based on 2014).
See Mohaddes and Pesaran (2017) for more details.
10See also Mohaddes and Raissi (2015) who quantify the global macroeconomic consequences of falling oil
prices due to the oil revolution in the United States.
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Russia and Saudi Arabia) or alternatively transferred less revenue to these funds. To give
a concrete example, since 1976 the Kuwaiti government has by law transferred a minimum
of 10 percent of all state revenues to the Future Generation Fund (FGF). However, with oil
prices having been high for almost a decade it was announced in March 2013, following an
Amir budgetary decree, that the minimum contribution is to be increased to 25 percent. But
the following year oil prices fell sharply and remained low, and so the decision was reversed
and the contribution to the FGF was cut back to 10 percent from scal year 2015/16.
We next check the robustness of our results to the denition of SWF and re-estimate
our growth regressions (11) excluding the seven countries whose SWFs are mainly funded by
non-commodity revenues (Australia, Bolivia, Indonesia, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, and
Senegal). The results are reported in Table 4 and echo those in Table 3: while the coe¢ cient
on volatility is negative and statistically signicant across all lag orders, the coe¢ cient of
the interactive dummy is always positive and signicant.
Table 4: Estimates of the Long-Run E¤ects on Real GDP Growth when Consid-
ering Institutions and Di¤erent SWF Groupings, (1981-2014)
Excluding Non-Commodity SWFs Role of Institutions
Full sample (69 Countries) 29 Countries with SWF
Lags 1 2 3 1 2 3
CToT Growth 0.0014* 0.0025z 0.0035z 0.0025y 0.0020 0.0026*
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014)
CToT Volatility -0.0056y -0.0069z -0.0124z -0.0283* -0.0364y -0.0527z
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0161) (0.0169) (0.0167)
Interactive SWF Dummy 0.0080y 0.0127z 0.0167z - - -
(0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0038)
Interactive Institutional Term - - - 0.0004* 0.0005y 0.0007z
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
CD Test Statistic -2.49 -1.82 -0.53 1.06 0.54 -0.06
No Countries 69 69 69 29 29 29
No Observations 2,218 2,149 2,080 927 898 869
Notes: The dependant variable is the growth of real GDP per capita. See also notes to Table 3.
Our results are in line with a number of recent papers that investigate the role of
oil/stabilization funds in (i) reducing scal pro-cyclicality and (ii) smoothing government
consumption.11 Coutinho et al. (2013) argue that resource funds tend to dampen scal
pro-cyclicality. Sugawara (2014) shows that government expenditure volatility is lower in
11Note that there is a large literature investigating whether scal policy is pro-cyclical in emerging and
developing countries. See, for instance, Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy (2010), Erbil (2011), and Céspedes
and Velasco (2014), who focus on a sample of oil producing and commodity abundant countries and argue
that overall scal policy has been pro-cyclical in these countries.
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countries with stabilization funds. Koh (2016) illustrates that scal policy becomes more
counter-cyclical after the establishment of oil funds, and that these funds are typically asso-
ciated with smoother government consumption. Moreover, Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007) argue
that oil funds help reduce macroeconomic volatility in oil exporting countries, more speci-
cally, the volatility of broad money, prices, and (to some extent) the real exchange rate.
Given the large heterogeneity within the 29 SWF countries in our sample, a follow-up
question is the potential role of institutions and policy frameworks, and in particular scal
policy, in dampening the negative e¤ect of CToT volatility. To investigate this issue, we add
an interactive term, (I  CToT;it) ; to the vector of explanatory variables, xit, in equation
(11). I is based on data from the Political Risk Services Group databases, measuring the
average quality of institutions between 1984-2012, and takes a value between 0 and 100.
The results are reported in the second block of Table 4, and perhaps not surprisingly,
illustrate that within the SWF sample, countries with stronger institutions, have been better
able to mitigate the negative growth e¤ects of CToT volatility. Note that the coe¢ cient of
CToT;it is negative and signicant for all lag orders, while the coe¢ cient of the interactive
institutional quality term is positive and statistically signicant for p = 1; 2; and 3. These
results are in line with Frankel et al. (2013), who argue that the better institutions in devel-
oping countries are, the more likely they are to pursue less procyclical or more countercyclical
scal policy, as well as Sugawara (2014) who shows that the two signicant factors in re-
ducing government expenditure volatility are stronger institutions and scal rules. Overall,
our results suggest that while volatility represents a fundamental barrier to economic pros-
perity, the establishment of SWFs, as well as appropriate institutions, can help mitigate the
negative e¤ects. Therefore, creating a mechanism of short-term management of commodity
price volatility through stabilization funds should be a priority for commodity dependant
countries, complemented by well-functioning public nancial management systems.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributed to the literature by examining empirically the e¤ects of commodity
price booms and CToT volatility on GDP per capita growth and its sources. We created an
annual panel dataset and used the CS-ARDL approach to account for endogeneity, cross-
country heterogeneity, and cross-sectional dependence which arise from unobserved common
factors. The main nding was that while CToT growth enhances real output per capita,
CToT volatility exerts a negative impact on economic growth operating through lower ac-
cumulation of physical capital and lower TFP. Our econometric results also showed that,
on average, having a SWF can mitigate such negative growth e¤ects, especially in countries
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that enjoy higher-quality institutions (and hence less pro-cyclical scal policies).
Our results have strong policy implications. The undesirable consequences of commodity
price volatility can be avoided if resource-rich countries are able to improve the management
of volatility in resource income by setting up forward-looking institutions such as Sovereign
Wealth Funds, or adopting short-term mechanisms such as stabilization funds with the aim
of saving when commodity prices are high and spending accumulated revenues when prices
are low. The government can also intervene in the economy by increasing public capital
expenditure when private investment is low, using proceeds from the stabilization fund.
Alternatively the government can use these funds to increase the complementarities of phys-
ical and human capital, such as improving the judicial system, property rights, and human
capital. This would increase the returns on investment with positive e¤ects on capital accu-
mulation, TFP, and growth. Improving the functioning of nancial markets is also a crucial
step as this allows rms and households to insure against shocks, decreasing uncertainty and
therefore mitigating the negative e¤ects of volatility on investment and economic growth.
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